



In mathematical logic, Craig’s Theorem (not to be confused with Craig’s 
Interpolation Theorem) states that any recursively enumerable theory is recursively 
axiomatizable. Its epistemological interest concerns its possible use as a method of 
eliminating “theoretical content” from scientific theories.  
Proof of Craig’s Theorem: Assume that S is a deductively closed set of sentences, 
whose elements may be recursively enumerated thus F(0), F(1), …, F(n), …, where F 
is a recursive function from natural numbers to sentences (we assume that 
expressions, sentences, etc., have been Gödel-coded in some manner). The set of 
theorems of an axiomatic theory is automatically recursively enumerable. But, in 
general, a recursively enumerable set is not automatically recursive. An example of a 
recursively enumerable set which is non-recursive is the set of logical truths in a first-
order language with a single dyadic predicate (this result i  known as Church’s 
Theorem). However, by a trick devised by Craig, we can define a recursive set 
Craig(S) whose deductive closure is S. Let A be a sentence and n a natural number. 
Let An be the (n+1)-fold conjunction A ∧ …. ∧ A. The sentence An is logically 
interdeducible with A. Next, consider sentences of the form F(n)n. Define Craig(S) to 
be {F(n)n: n ∈ N}. The deductive closure of Craig(S) must be S, since each element of 
Craig(S) is equivalent to an element of S. Next, we give an informal decision 
procedure for membership in Craig(S). Given a sentence A, to decide whether A ∈ 
Craig(S), first check if A has the form Bn, for some sentence B and number n. By 
unique readability, this is checkable, and if A is not of this form, then A ∉ Craig(S). 
So, suppose that A is of the form Bn. We calculate F(n), and if B is indeed F(n), then A 
∈ Craig(S). And otherwise, A ∉ Craig(S). The existence of a decision procedure for 
membership in Craig(S) implies that Craig(S) is recursive. The set Craig(S) is 
therefore a recursive axiomatization of the theory S. 
2. Craigian Elimination 
The logical positivists held that, under a logical reconstruction, a scientific theory is 
an axiom system formulated in a language L(O, T), where extra-logical predicates and 
function symbols are classified as either O-terms, for observational properties, or T-
terms, for theoretical properties. Statements in L(O, T) can be classified as 
observational, theoretical, or mixed, depending upon the presence or absence of O-
terms or T-terms. Deleting theoretical terms yields a sublanguage L(O), whose 
sentences express observational or empirical claims bout the world. Assume that the 
property of being an L(O)-sentence is recursive. Consider a recursively enumerable 
theory S in L(O, T). The empirical content of S is the set of L(O)-theorems of S. This 
is a subtheory of S obtained by a restriction on a recursive property. So, it is 
recursively enumerable too. By Craig’s Theorem, there is a recursive set of L(O)-
sentences whose deductive closure is the empirical content of S. On these 
assumptions, we can therefore recursively axiomatize the empirical content of any 
given scientific theory S, obtaining a recursive axiom system Craig(S), known as the 
Craigian reaxiomatization of S’s empirical content. 
3. Philosophical Significance of Craigian Elimination 
Instrumentalism or positivism about science involves a scepticism towards the non-
observational content of a scientific theory. Lacking such content, the Craigian 
reaxiomatization Craig(S) thus provides an object of ration l belief compatible with 
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instrumentalist or positivist scruples. Note that this el mination method need not be 
based on an observation/theory distinction. By obvious modification, it can be used as 
a way of eliminating, say, mathematical content from a scientific theory formulated 
using mathematical predicates and quantification over sets, functions, etc., or as a way 
of eliminating theoretical content from a psychological theory that refers to mental 
states, and so on. So, Craigian reaxiomatization offers a possible elimination strategy 
for a variety of instrumentalist positions. 
4. Criticisms of Craigian Elimination 
There are two methodological criticisms. First, even if the original theory S is 
presented in a simple manner, the reaxiomatization Craig(S) will be quite complex, 
and thus will violate the canon of simplicity which we might impose on admissible 
theories. Second, Craig(S) is parasitic upon the original theory S, and so does not 
really stand alone from the original theory. Indeed, Craig(S) is a bizarre theory, 
having infinitely many axioms of the form An, where A is an empirical consequence of 
S. Hartry Field refers to Craigian reaxiomatization as “bizarre trickery” and complains 
that Craig(S) is “obviously uninteresting, since [it] does nothing towards explaining 
the phenomenon in question in terms of a small number of basic principles” (Field 
1980, p. 8). A third criticism is that Craigian elimination rests on a mistaken 
conception of scientific theories, namely a syntactic view of theories. This criticism 
has been urged by Bas van Fraassen, who writes “empirical import cannot be isolated 
syntactically … the reduced theory Craig(S) is not a description of the observable part 
of the world of S; rather it is a hobbled and hamstrung version of S’s description of 
everything” (van Fraassen 1976, pp. 87-88). A final criticism attacks the tenability of 
the observation/theory distinction required. For a simple example, although ‘red’ 
seems a paradigmatic observational term, we can nonetheless talk of red blood cells, 
which are too small to be visible to the naked eye (see Putnam 1962).  
Modulo certain assumptions discussed above concerning the notion of “empirical 
content”, Craig’s Theorem tells us that we can reaxiomatize the empirical content of a 
scientific theory, thereby eliminating apparent reference to unobservable objects and 
properties. However, this elimination procedure has not found many adherents, and it 
seems safe to say that the significance of Craigian elimination is primarily 
pedagogical. 
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